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assment cases. The implicit assumption is that the social harms
and public policy goals of racial harassment and sexual harassment are sufficiently similar to justify analogous scrutiny and
remedies. Parties to racial harassment cases cite the reasoning
and elements of sexual harassment cases without hesitation, as if
racial harassment and sexual harassment are behaviorally and legally indistinguishable.
This Article, however, questions the assumption that there
should be a monolithic model for discriminatory workplace harassment. In particular, it questions whether the currently dominant sexual harassment model should be used automatically as
the paradigm in racial harassment disputes. Part I begins by acknowledging and explaining why the legal community analogizes
racial harassment claims and jurisprudence to sexual harassment
claims and jurisprudence. Part II posits that this analogy is problematic given the fundamental differences between racial and
sexual harassment. While empirical evidence of these differences
is currently limited, Part II identifies and discusses two pioneering examples. The first documents important dissimilarities between racial harassment litigation and sexual harassment
litigation; the second chronicles the differences between the dynamics and theoretical explanations for racial and sexual harassment in the law firm context.
Given the dominance of the sexual harassment model and the
presumption of its applicability to other harassment disputes, including racial harassment, it is not surprising that comparatively
little research and study of racial harassment and other forms of
harassment have been done. The discussion and analysis here
contributes to the research on the topic. Finally, Part III explores the implications of freeing racial harassment from the sexual harassment model.
I
UNDERSTANDING

A.

THE ANALOGY

Analogizing Racial Harassment and Sexual Harassment

The preeminent legislative purpose of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was to rectify racial discrimination; the last-minute inclusion
of gender discrimination was reported as a desperate attempt to
defeat the proposed legislation.1 Similarly, the judiciary first rec1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID

D.

KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOY-
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ognized the harassment doctrine under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act in a landmark racial harassment case,2 not in a sexual
harassment case.

Scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon and Lin Farley, however, reframed workplace harassment as sexual harassment, introducing a provocative conceptual model for sexual harassment
as impermissible intentional discrimination.3 An extensive and
impressive array of other scholars continued to develop the legal
and public policy issues of sexual harassment, thus further establishing sexual harassment as the paradigm for harassment in the
workplace. 4 Also, a line of important Supreme Court cases be-

gan drawing the jurisprudential principles for harassment law in
the context of sexual harassment disputes, beginning with Meritor and continuing with the Harris, Oncale, Ellerth, and
Faragher cases.5 In addition, the public has been mesmerized by
highly publicized and tantalizing stories of sexual harassment.6
MENT LAW

3 n.2 (1992); Kim M. Blankenship, Bringing Gender and Race In: U.S.

Employment Discrimination Policy, 7 GENDER & Soc. 204, 205, 219-20 (1993); see
also 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 3213-28 (1968); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431, 441 (1966). But see Jo Freeman, How
"Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW

& INEQ. 163 (1991) (suggesting that inclusion of sex was more purposeful than commonly believed).
2 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
3 See, e.g., LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
4 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL

L.

REV.

1169 (1998); Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harass-

ment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1993); Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
5 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (offering guidelines on
employer liability); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (exploring the evolving conception of sexual harassment by considering the motivational link in harassment cases;
that is, whether the harassment was "because of sex"); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993) (clarifying the elements of a hostile environment claim, including
the critical requirement that the harassment must be sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter the work environment); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986) (first Supreme Court case recognizing sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII).
6 See, e.g., Dianne Rucinski, Rush to Judgment? Fast Reaction Polls in the Anita
Hill-ClarenceThomas Controversy, 57 PUB. OPINION Q. 575 (1993) (surveying public opinions on Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment against her former employer Clarence Thomas). For example, one case that caught the public's attention
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Fueled in part by these events, the study of sexual harassment as
a social phenomenon and the development of sexual harassment
jurisprudence has significantly evolved. Sexual harassment has
considerable public and academic visibility. Employee training
programs on "what is sexual harassment" are widespread. In
contrast, despite its prominence in Title VII's legislative history
and its ongoing social pervasiveness, the study of racial harassment and its jurisprudence has languished. In comparison to sexual harassment, research on racial harassment is minuscule.7
The lack of a distinctive jurisprudential model for racial harassment, however, has not prompted jurists or others to propose
one. Instead, they simply apply the legal principles developed in
the context of sexual harassment to complaints of racial harassment. 8 It appears they view the jurisprudential model for workplace harassment as monolithic, and that the monolithic model
should be the one designed for sexual harassment.
It is not surprising that federal courts take this approach, given
the Supreme Court's implicit endorsement. In recognizing sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII, Justice Rehnquist drew
direct parallels to racial harassment. 9 Quoting from Henson v.
Dundee, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Sexual harassment . . . is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial
equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning
and
1°
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
was Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, in which an appellate court in California held a
large law firm liable for $50,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages for sexual harassment by a partner who was a serial harasser of law
firm employees. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Ct. App. 1998).
7 See generally Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment
Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49 (2006) (summarizing the limited research
on racial harassment).
8 Id. at 57 (noting the pervasive citing of the Harris case in racial harassment
cases); L. Camille Hbert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment
Claims, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 819, 821-36 (discussing judicial analogizing of racial harassment and sexual harassment); Debra Domenick, Comment, Title VII: How Recent
Developments in the Law of Sexual HarassmentApply with Equal Force to Claims of
Racial Harassment, 103 DICK. L. REV. 765 (1999). My review of numerous racial
harassment cases in Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, also reveals this pattern.
9 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(11th Cir. 1982)).
10
Id. at 67.

2006]

Freeing Racial Harassmentfrom the Sexual Harassment Model

619

Justice Ginsburg, concurring in Harris, also pointedly refers to
the equivalency of sexual and racial harassment jurisprudence."
B.

Rationalizing the Analogy

Analogizing racial harassment claims to sexual harassment
claims is not totally unreasonable. Analogizing from one type of
fact pattern to another and from one type of claim to another is a
fundamental analytic tool of lawyers and academics."2 Social
scientists also observe that there is the human tendency to analogize and generalize.' 3 When one is confronted with an unfamiliar
or complex situation, he or she tries to make sense and create
order by comparing the circumstances to what is familiar and by
simplifying the issues to what is understandable.
In addition to these more generic legal and human tendencies
to analogize, particular reasons to analogize in the context of racial and sexual harassment exist. Both types of harassment
claims originate from the same legislative source and share the
common goal of eliminating a hostile working environment for
4
those who have historically been disadvantaged in employment.1
Both victims of sexual harassment and victims of racial harassment are deprived of the right to a nondiscriminatory working
environment and are debilitated by that deprivation. 5
11 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)) (advocating
the same burden of proof for plaintiffs in gender discrimination cases as in racial
discrimination cases).
12 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL

ARGUMENT (2005); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,
and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARE. L. REV. 923,

1016-18 (1996).
13 See, e.g., MARTHA

MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, Ex-

CLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 1, 3-4 (1990) (discussing consequences of categoriza-

tion); Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings:
Problems and Prospects, in THE CONFLICT & CULTURE READER 7, 7-14 (Pat K.

Chew ed., 2001) (describing the tendency to explain an "opaque" culture with logic
from our own "transparent" culture); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically
Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1145-63 (2004) (explaining the categorization process and its
effects).

14 See sources cited supra note 1; see also Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate
of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and HistoricalPerspective, 110

YALE L.J. 1045 (2001) (describing a purposeful analogy between gender and race in
civil rights over time).
15 See generally THERESA

M.

BEINER, GENDER MYTHs V. WORKING REALITIES:

USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (2005); MIA
L. CAHILL, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: THE ROLE
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Analogizing racial harassment (and other forms of harass-

ment) to sexual harassment also serves varied political agendas.
For instance, politicians who believe that Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws should be interpreted restrictively may

find that confining harassment claims to one monolithic model is
an expedient way to limit protection of disadvantaged groups.
All harassment claims, no matter their character, would be tied

to the same set of requirements. To the extent that those requirements are burdensome, all claims would be similarly
burdened.

6

Feminist activist scholars also may prefer that sexual harassment retain center stage. Given that women are the most likely
targets of sexual harassment, ongoing scholarship on and judicial
attention to sexual harassment would better serve a feminist political agenda. The research on sexual harassment is focused on

the rights of women and tends to take into account17 race only
when it is framed as a variant of sexual harassment.
II
THE PROBLEM WITH THE ANALOGY

Despite these rational reasons for so believing, the assumption
that the legal analysis for sexual harassment and racial harassment should be the same is untested. Given the pervasiveness of
racial harassment in the workplace and the increasing number of

racial harassment lawsuits, it seems imperative to question this
assumption.
OF THE NATIONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL CONTEXT (2001); JOE R.
FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS (2000); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

(Rebecca M. Blank, Marilyn Dabady & Constance F. Citro eds., 2004); Maria P.P.
Root, The Consequences of Racial and Ethnic Origins Harassment in the Workplace,
in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 125 (Kimberly Holt Barrett & William
H. George eds., 2005).
16 See Hdbert, supra note 8, at 860-62 (describing this risk for racial harassment
plaintiffs); Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment DiscriminationCases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
839 (2004) (arguing that analogizing ageism to racism creates similar burdens on age
discrimination plaintiffs).
17 See, e.g., NiCole T. Buchanan & Alayne J. Ormerod, Racialized Sexual Harass-

ment in the Lives of African American Women, in VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF
BLACK WOMEN: BATTERED, BLACK, AND BLUE 107 (Carolyn M. West ed., 2002);
Audrey J. Murrell, Sexual Harassmentand Women of Color: Issues, Challenges, and
Future Directions, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES,
FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 51 (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996).
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Furthermore, L. Camille H6bert asserts that analogizing racial
harassment cases to sexual harassment cases may bolster the sexual harassment plaintiffs' claims, but analogizing sexual harassment cases to racial harassment claims may have the opposite
result for racial harassment plaintiffs. 8 She notes characteristics
of sexual harassment jurisprudence: courts require plaintiffs
show the harassment was "unwelcome," impose a very high standard for "severe or pervasive" harassment, defer to a "genderneutral" rather than a "reasonable woman's" perspective of what
constitutes harassment, and find even explicit sexually related
behavior to be not motivated by sex. 19 Importing these standards into racial harassment classes, Professor Hbert argues,
might be inappropriate and might harm legitimate racial harassment claims.20 A recent study of racial harassment cases suggests
that Hdbert's concerns are justified. The study indicates that
courts in racial harassment cases do indeed impose a very high
standard for "severe or pervasive" harassment, defer to a raceneutral perspective on what constitutes harassment, and may find
even explicit racially related harassment to be not motivated by
21
race.
Moreover, one would guess intuitively that sex discrimination
(including sexual harassment) and race discrimination (including
racial harassment) are fundamentally different social phenomena
with distinct causes, manifestations, and remedies. Simply put,
prejudice on the basis of gender is not the same as prejudice on
the basis of race.22 Given these fundamental differences, one
would also guess that racial harassment litigation and sexual harassment litigation are distinctive.
Like many things that seem obvious on their face, substantiating an intuition with empirical evidence that racial harassment
and sexual harassment are distinct is challenging. While there is
some research contrasting sex discrimination and race discrimiH6bert, supra note 8, at 860.
19 See id. at 848-66.
20 See id. at 878-79.
21 See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 87-88. For instance, when the plaintiffs
claimed defendants used obvious racist objects, such as nooses or Ku Klux Klanassociated attire, the plaintiffs were successful in their judicial proceedings only a
third of the time. Id. at 87-88, 88 tbl.14.
22 See generally Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance
of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or
Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialismin Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
18
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nation in general, 3 there is surprisingly little that expressly studies the differences between sexual harassment and racial

harassment. In theory, one also could identify studies on sexual
harassment and studies on racial harassment and look for appropriate ways to compare the data gathered in these studies. However, the paucity of racial harassment research limits this
approach.
There is one study, however, that compares sexual harassment
and racial harassment in law firms. In addition, there are two
empirical studies, one on sexual harassment litigation and one on

racial harassment litigation, that enable a comparison of the
plaintiffs' profiles and the judicial outcomes in each type of lawsuit. While more study of this topic would be helpful, this emerg-

ing research clearly illustrates that there are fundamental
differences between the two forms of harassment. As the evidence below indicates, racial harassment litigation and sexual

harassment litigation are distinguishable in very fundamental
ways. As this Article will subsequently discuss, theories explaining sexual harassment and racial harassment in law firms are dis-

tinct. These dissimilarities evidence the problem with
automatically analogizing between the two types of harassments.
A.

Racial Harassment Litigation and Sexual
HarassmentLitigation

Ann Juliano and Stewart Schwab studied all federal sexual
harassment cases between 1986 and 1996.24 In a separate research project, Robert Kelley and I analyzed a representative
sample of all federal racial harassment cases between 1976 and
23 The extensive research on sex discrimination and race discrimination tends to
study each form of discrimination independently of one another. See sources cited
supra note 14. Some researchers, however, consider the relationship between sex
and race discrimination. See, e.g., Blankenship, supra note 1; William A. Darity, Jr.
& Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discriminationin Employment: Codes of Color,
Codes of Gender, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 63 (describing evidence of dis-

criminatory treatment as a major cause of racial and gender employment disparities); Mark Pogrebin, Mary Dodge & Harold Chatman, Reflections of AfricanAmerican Women on Their Careers in Urban Policing: Their Experiences of Racial
and Sexual Discrimination, 28 Irrr'L J. Soc. L. 311, 314-19 (2000) (describing the
gender discrimination and the racial discrimination faced by African American women police officers). Darity and Mason include separate discussions of research
studies on race, Darity & Mason, supra, at 70-76, and gender, id. at 68-70.
24 Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 548 (2001).
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2002.25 Among other topics, these studies consider the plaintiffs
and judicial outcomes in these lawsuits. A comparative analysis
of these two studies reveals striking variations between sexual
harassment and racial harassment cases:2 6 gender and racial
profiles of the plaintiffs in the two types of cases contrast; judges
in the two types of cases reach dramatically different conclusions
about whether harassment occurred.
1. Distinctive Plaintiffs' Profiles
Table 1 shows that the plaintiffs' gender profile in racial har-

assment cases contrasts dramatically with the plaintiffs' gender
profile in sexual harassment cases. This research indicates that
men are slightly more likely than women to be the plaintiffs in
racial harassment lawsuits, while women are almost always the

plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases.

25 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54. The project included 260 cases randomly selected to be representative of the universe of cases. See id. (explaining
research methodology).
26 While the two studies are comparable in a number of ways, there are differences as well. The sexual harassment study covers only ten years (1986 to 1996),
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, at 550, whereas the racial harassment study essentially covers the entire litigation history of racial harassment cases up through 2002,
Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54. Although we assume that the cases in the
sexual harassment study are representative of all cases, we cannot be certain that the
cases between 1976 and 1985 or between 1997 and 2002 have the same characteristics as those in the study. Also, the two studies differ in some of the research methodologies utilized. Both types of litigation had approximately the same percentage
of district court and appellate court cases (the percentage of racial harassment cases
is 79.2% at the district court level, and 20.4% at the appellate court level; the percentage of sexual harassment cases is 75.4% at the district court level, and 24.6% at
the appellate court level). Compare Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 76 tbl.9, with
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, at 556. In addition, the sexual harassment study
focuses on the differences between district court and appellate court cases, see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, at 554, 560-76, while the racial harassment study tends
to summarize the cases as a whole, see Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54. With
some simple calculations, however, we are able to use the data available about the
sexual harassment cases to compute aggregate data about the cases as a whole. At
other times, the differences in methodologies limited the possible comparisons.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF RACIAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL
27
HARASSMENT CASES
As % of
All Racial
Harassment
Cases

Number
of
Cases

As % of
All Sexual
Harassment
Cases

Number
of
Cases

Plantiffs' Gender:
Women
Men

41.5
58.5

108
152

94.8
5.2

616
34

Plantiffs' Race:
African American
Hispanic American
Asian American
Native American
White American

81.6
4.7
4.7
0.4
8.6

191
11
11
1
20

51.9
17.0
2.8
0.9
27.4

55
18
3
1
29

TABLE

2

GENDER AND RACE AS PERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE
Gender:
Women
Men

46.6
53.4

Race:
African American
Hispanic American
Asian American
Native American
White American

11.9
13.4
3.9
0.9
70.0

28

In racial harassment cases, 58.5% of the plaintiffs are men and
41.5% are women. These percentages approximate the gender
ratio in the general labor force, which is shown in Table 2, suggesting that racial harassers do not disproportionately target individuals of either sex. In the alternative, it could be that these
percentages in racial harassment cases underestimate the number

of women who are actually harassed. First, there is evidence that
27 The statistics regarding racial harassment draw from Chew & Kelley, supra
note 7, at 64 tbl.1, and the statistics concerning sexual harassment are derived from
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594-97.
28

See U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

2002, at 16 tbl.14, 368 tbl.562 (122d ed. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/past-years.html (follow "2001-2005" hyperlink; then download
"Zip" file for 2002). For further explanation of how these percentages are derived,
contact the author.
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women are more hesitant than men to complain.2 9 Second,
plaintiffs who are targets of both sexual and racial harassment
may not file a racial harassment complaint, instead incorporating
racial harassment incidents into their sexual harassment claim.
Lawyers may advise them to follow this litigation approach because, like everyone else, lawyers are more familiar with and
more readily identify with the sexual harassment model. Furthermore, lawyers may see harassment that includes both sexual
and racial harassment more as a variant of sexual harassment
than as separate, distinct racial and sexual harassment claims. Finally, framing a lawsuit as a sexual harassment rather than a racial harassment claim may have strategic advantages.3"
Among the cases in which the plaintiffs' race and ethnicity are
known, there are striking differences in the plaintiffs' racial
profiles.3 1 Minority plaintiffs, particularly Black plaintiffs, outnumber White plaintiffs in both types of cases. Moreover, the
gap between Black and White plaintiffs in racial harassment
cases is greater than in sexual harassment cases. The very high
percentage of Black plaintiffs indicates that Blacks disproportionately bring racial harassment lawsuits, suggesting that they
perceive they are being racially harassed and act on that perception much more frequently than other racial groups.32
Given the racial composition in the national labor force, which
is shown in Table 2, the racial representation in these cases raises
puzzling issues. For example, while one might expect that Blacks
would be overrepresented to some extent in racial harassment
cases (81.6%), it is unclear why their percentage in sexual harassment cases (51.9%) is so much higher than their percentage in
29

See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-42 (2005)
(summarizing social science research on employees' reluctance to acknowledge and
report discrimination).
30 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing outcomes of cases).
31 One consideration in interpreting this data is that the availability of plaintiffs'
race differs in the two types of cases. Plaintiffs' races are identifiable in a high percentage of the racial harassment cases (90%), Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 63
n.62, 64 & tbl.1, but were available in only a comparatively small percentage of the
sexual harassment cases (15.9%), Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594.
Thus, the percentages in Table 1 are based on 106 cases in the sexual harassment
study, Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594, and 234 cases in the racial
harassment study, Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 63 n.62. The race of many plaintiffs in the sexual harassment cases is unknown. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note
24, app. A, at 594. To the extent that a number of these unknown plaintiffs are
White, the actual racial composition may differ substantially.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 105-08.
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the labor force (11.9%). Similarly, while one might expect that
Whites would be underrepresented to some extent in racial har-

assment cases (8.6%), it is unclear why their percentage in sexual
harassment cases (27.4%) is so much lower than their percentage
in the labor force (70.0%). In contrast, both Hispanic American
and Asian American representation among plaintiffs in sexual

harassment cases more closely approximates their representation
in the labor force. Could it be that Black women are particularly
targeted for sexual harassment?3 3

Plaintiffs in these two types of cases also describe their harassment differently. While plaintiffs accuse both racial and sexual
harassers of using verbal comments, physical objects, physical
conduct, and employment decisions, the degree and content of

these harassing behaviors differ. Offensive oral comments, such
as derogatory and belittling language, are commonly reported by
plaintiffs in both racial and sexual harassment cases, but the content of these comments reflects different prejudicial stereotypes.3 4 In the relatively small percentage of cases in which
plaintiffs report the use of physical materials and objects, such as
letters, posters, graffiti, and clothing, the particular objects used
also differs, depending on the form of harassment.3 5
Finally, the differing degrees to which plaintiffs in the two
types of harassment identify management and other work-related

decisions as a form of harassment are striking. Plaintiffs in racial
harassment cases are much more likely to cite work-related deci-

sions as an example of harassment (65.8% citing less favorable
treatment in work assignments and conditions)36 than plaintiffs
33 For further discussion on this inquiry, see Buchanan & Ormerod, supra note 17,
H6bert, supra note 8, and Pogrebin et al., supra note 23.
34 Plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases claim, for instance, that harassers make
oral comments about their physical appearance and sexual comments in over 47% of
the cases. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 596. These percentages on
the nature of sexual harassment are based on all 666 sexual harassment cases. See
id. Plaintiffs in racial harassment cases instead report ethnic and racial slurs associated with their race. Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 72-74 & tbl.8.
35 For example, objects such as nooses and Ku Klux Klan attire are used in 5.8%
of racial harassment cases. Id. In contrast, sexual materials are left for the plaintiff
in 5.1% of the sexual harassment cases. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at
596. Physical contact of a sexual nature (such as grabbing and pinching) is cited in
43.2% of sexual harassment cases; physical contact of a nonsexual nature is cited in
9.0% of sexual harassment cases. Id. In contrast, physical contact in racial harassment cases, such as shoving and hitting, is reported in only 15% of the cases. Chew
& Kelley, supra note 7, at 74 tbl.8.
36 Id.
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in sexual harassment cases (27.0% citing less favorable treatment
in work assignments and conditions).3 7 This data suggests that
racial harassment plaintiffs are more sensitive than sexual harass-

ment plaintiffs to the possibility that supervisors and coworkers
use employment decisions and management discretion as forms
of harassment and discrimination. In the alternative, it could be
that these management decisions and discretion are used more as
a form of racial harassment than as a form of sexual harassment.
In summary, the plaintiffs' gender and racial profiles in racial

harassment cases are notably different than the plaintiffs' profiles
in sexual harassment cases. Plaintiffs in the two types of litigation also describe their harassment in distinguishable ways.3 8

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiffs in these cases are a
proxy for racially and sexually harassed employees in general,3 9
these studies support the distinctiveness of these groups.
2. DisparateJudicial Outcomes
While courts repeatedly state that the same legal principles
and purposes apply to both sexual harassment and racial harass-

ment cases, courts in fact treat these claims disparately. This Article's comparative analysis of the outcomes of sexual harassment
and racial harassment proceedings reveals that plaintiffs in sexual
harassment cases fare much better than plaintiffs in racial harassment cases. This finding is surprising given the societal belief
37

Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 596.
attempted to compare the plaintiffs' occupations. The two studies categorize
occupations in different ways, so it is not possible to compare the differences among
specific occupations. What is clear, however, is that both alleged racial harassment
and sexual harassment occur across many occupational areas. They are not limited
to those in clerical or blue-collar positions; individuals in professional and management occupations bring a notable percentage of the racial harassment cases (19.3%),
Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 66 tbl.3, and sexual harassment cases (28.1%),
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594. Both types of litigation also had
approximately the same percentage of cases dealing with private and public sector
employment settings. Compare Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 70 tbl.6 (noting
that the percentage of racial harassment cases is 69.6% in the private sector and
30.4% in the public sector), with Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 595
(noting that the percentage of sexual harassment cases is 71% in the private sector
and 29% in the public sector). Thus, it appears that sexual and racial harassment
occurs throughout the workforce. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 66 tbl.3, 70
tbl.6; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594-95.
39 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 52 n.7 (explaining caveats in generalizing from
a study of judicial opinions on racial harassment complaints to generalizing about
racial harassment in the workplace).
38 1
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that racial discrimination and harassment is at least as offensive
as sexual discrimination and harassment.

Summarizing the legal proceedings helps provide the litigation
context. First, while plaintiffs in harassment cases technically
have a right to a jury trial, 40 in practice, they rarely reach this

stage in litigation. Instead, their complaints are typically resolved at pretrial judicial proceedings. 4 The most common pro-

ceeding at the district court level for both types of cases is a
pretrial motion dealing with the substance of the claim.42 As
demonstrated in Table 3, the types of proceedings parallel one

another, although the outcomes of the proceedings differ.4 3 In
sexual harassment proceedings, plaintiffs are successful 48.2% of
the time (in 321 cases).' In contrast, plaintiffs in racial harassment proceedings are successful only 21.5% of the time (in 57
cases).4 5 Judges in racial harassment cases are much more likely
than judges in sexual harassment cases to grant defendants' pretrial motions and consequently keep plaintiffs from moving past
that gate toward a trial. Overall, plaintiffs in sexual harassment
proceedings are more than twice as likely to be successful as

plaintiffs in racial harassment cases, which indicates that judges
are much less likely to be persuaded by racial harassment plaintiffs than sexual harassment plaintiffs. Thus, while some legal
scholars suggest that judges are more sympathetic to plaintiffs in
racial harassment cases, 46 the evidence from these studies is con42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000).
See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at
77.
42 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 77; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A,
at 597.
43 It is also interesting that both types of cases published in the Federal Reporters
have a higher plaintiffs' win rate than cases in general. The plaintiffs' success rate in
sexual harassment cases published in the official reporter is 53% compared to the
average success rate of all sexual harassment cases of 48.2%. Juliano & Schwab,
supra note 24, app. A, at 594. The plaintiffs' success rate of racial harassment cases
published in the official reporter is 30.7% compared to the average of 21.5%. See
Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 84, 91 tbl.16.
44 The plaintiffs' success rate is 51.2% in district court proceedings and 39% in
appellate court proceedings. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594.
45 The plaintiffs' success rate is 20.8% in district court proceedings and 24.5% in
appellate
court proceedings. Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 90 tbl.15.
46
See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a "Bitch" Just Don't Use the "NWord": Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations
and Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 741, 74243 (1997); Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: RequiringHostile Environment Sexual Harassmentto Be "Severe or Pervasive" DiscriminatesAmong "Terms
40
41
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trary to that proposition.
TABLE 3
47
PLAINTIFFS' SUCCESS RATES IN HARASSMENT CASES
Plaintiffs'
Success
Rates in
Racial
Harassment
Cases
Of All Cases
By Plaintiffs' Gender.
Women
Men
By Plaintiffs' Race:
African American
Hispanic American
Asian American
Native American
White American

Number
of
Successful
Cases

Plaintiffs'
Success
Rates in
Sexual
Harassment
Cases

Number
of
Successful
Cases

21.5

57

48.2

321

20.8
22.8

21
33

48.1
38.2

296
13

19.3
54.5
18.1
0.0
35.0

37
6
2
0
7

45.5
55.6
66.7
0.0
27.6

25
10
2
0
8

Table 3 compares in more detail how the outcomes in racial
harassment and sexual harassment cases differ. For instance, one
can contrast how men and women plaintiffs fare across and
within each type of case. While women plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases have only a 48.1% chance of winning their cases, 48
they are still more than twice as likely to win than women plaintiffs in racial harassment cases (20.8% are successful). Male
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases also are much more likely to
and Conditions" of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 87-89 (2003); John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discriminationby Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676 (1971).
47 The statistics in Table 3 are derived from Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 86
tbl.13, and Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 594-95. There was only one
case in each study in which the plaintiff was identified as Native American. The
plaintiff was unsuccessful in both of those cases. For further detail on the
calculations in Table 3, see infra note 48.
48 To illustrate how the author calculated the numbers for Table 3 for the sexual
harassment cases, consider the following: The raw data for the calculations are provided in Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 595. To determine the effect of
the sex of the plaintiff on the plaintiffs' success rate in sexual harassment cases, one
adds the number of cases won by female plaintiffs at the district court level (464
cases times 50.9% equals 236.2) to the number of cases won by female plaintiffs at
the appellate court level (152 cases times 39.5% equals 60) and divides that sum by
the total number of cases in which the plaintiff is female (296.2 divided by 616 equals
48.1%). This formula is repeated for the cases in which the plaintiff is a male and
the result is a 38.2% win rate, etc.
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win (38.2% are successful) than their counterparts in racial harassment cases (22.8% are successful). 4 9
Among racial harassment cases, there are not significant gender differences. That is, both men and women racial harassment
plaintiffs lose approximately the same percentage of cases (about
80%).50 In contrast, there is approximately a 10% difference in
the success rates of men and women sexual harassment plaintiffs,
with women being more likely to win.
Considering the race and ethnicity of the plaintiff reveals some
intriguing contrasts.5 1 In particular, African American sexual
harassment plaintiffs are more than twice as likely (45.5%) as
their racial harassment counterparts (19.3%) to be successful.
Moreover, Black plaintiffs are more successful than White plaintiffs in sexual harassment suits (45.5% versus 27.6%), but less
successful than White plaintiffs in racial harassment suits (19.3%
versus 35%). Courts do not appear to find Blacks' claims of racial harassment particularly credible. White and Hispanic American plaintiffs have much more similar success rates across both
types of cases, with Hispanic plaintiffs having an approximately
55% success rate and Whites between a 27.6% to 35% success
rate in the two types of cases.
Both studies also keep track of the composition of the alleged
harassers, tracking whether the harassers consist of only supervisors, only coworkers, or both supervisors and coworkers. In almost half of the racial harassment cases5 2 and over half of the
sexual harassment cases,53 plaintiffs accused only supervisors.
However, the studies also indicate that harassment by both supervisors and coworkers is not rare, with this claim being made in
just under 20% of sexual harassment cases and over 30% of racial harassment cases. 54 This data hints that harassment may be
more of a group and socially accepted activity than most would
like to think.
The effect of the composition of the alleged harassers on out49 However, male plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases at the appellate level have
a win rate of only 14.3%. Id.
50 However, in more recent racial harassment cases, women tend to lose more
cases than men. Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 103-04 & fig.7.
51 See supra note 31 (describing caveat in interpreting race data).
52 Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 70 tbl.6.
53 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 595.
54
See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 70 tbl.6; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24,
app. A, at 595.
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come is also revealing. Sexual harassment plaintiffs have better
luck when their alleged harassers are only supervisors (48% success rate) rather than only coworkers (33.3% success rate).5 5 In
contrast, the courts in racial harassment cases appear to be indifferent to this distinction.56 However, judges in racial harassment
cases appear particularly influenced when both supervisors and
coworkers allegedly participate in the harassment.5 7 Perhaps the
suggestion that everyone is "ganging up" on a victim significantly
bolsters the case for racial harassment plaintiffs, almost doubling
the odds that judges will find in their favor.5 8
Considering more specific information about the harassing behavior in the two types of cases is interesting, but less conclusive.
For example, in racial harassment cases, plaintiffs have a higher
success rate when they claim blatant race-linked verbal and physical harassment than when they claim more contextual and subtle
harassment.5 9 It is not clear if judges in the sexual harassment
cases are similarly more persuaded by blatant sex-linked harassment, but there is evidence to suggest that they are.6 °
What explains the dramatic disparity in overall judicial outcomes (21.5% plaintiffs' success rate in racial harassment cases
versus 48.2% plaintiffs' success rate in sexual harassment cases)?
There are a number of possibilities. One might speculate that the
studies do not include representative cases. Perhaps the sexual
harassment study consists of stronger cases with particularly
favorable plaintiffs' facts than sexual harassment cases in general;
or in the alternative, the racial harassment study may consist of
weaker cases with particularly unfavorable plaintiffs' facts than
55

Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 595.

56 See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 86 tbl.13 (finding a success rate of approxi-

mately 17% in both types of cases).
57 Id.
58 See id. (finding that plaintiff success rate increases to 32.9%).
59 See id. at 87-88 & tbl.14. For instance, plaintiffs are successful in 33.3% of their
cases when they report harassers' use of ostensibly race-linked objects such as
nooses, white robes, and pointed hats-compared to an average plaintiffs' win rate
of 21.5%. See id. at 84, 88 tbl.14. Perhaps what is most striking is that plaintiffs still
lose two-thirds of the time in those cases.
60 For example, plaintiffs who complain of pornographic descriptions and sexual
materials left in their private space (such as their desks or lockers) have a significantly higher success rate (68% and 67.6% respectively) than the average plaintiffs'
success rate of 48.2%. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 24, app. A, at 596. Similarly,
plaintiffs who complain of physical contact of a sexual nature have a higher success
rate (55.9%) than plaintiffs who complain of physical contact of a nonsexual nature
(48.3%). Id.
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racial harassment cases in general. Given the research methods
used in both studies, 61 however, there is no reason to think that
the cases are not representative of each type of case.
It could also be that sexual harassment plaintiffs in general
have stronger cases that lead to more favorable outcomes. For
instance, because of the attention given to sexual harassment
laws, it may be that lawyers are better able to gauge and only
proceed with cases that have more reasonable chances of success.
In contrast, given the lack of attention and information on racial
harassment laws, it may be that lawyers are not as skillful at selecting stronger cases, and therefore proceed with a broader
range of cases.
In addition, while the two types of cases presumptively have
the same legal elements, in practice, some of the elements are
more salient. Courts and lawyers apparently find some elements
more applicable to one type of harassment than another. At the
same time, this difference in salience may make sexual harassment plaintiffs more successful. For example, except for cases
with allegations of same-sex harassment, courts do not seem to
question plaintiffs' claims that the harassment was "because of'
their sex. In contrast, courts appear more skeptical that harassment was "because of" the plaintiff's race, finding plausible a
multitude of alternative justifications for negative treatment of
minority employees.6" Sexual harassment plaintiffs also have an
additional basis for imposing liability, quid pro quo harassment,
while lawyers do not currently consider this a viable claim for
racial harassment plaintiffs.6 3 On the other hand, there are also
situations in which the differences in the elements' salience
would not logically result in more successful sexual harassment
plaintiffs. For example, sexual harassment plaintiffs have a more
onerous legal challenge given that courts require that they show
the harassment is "unwelcome," while courts do not appear to
impose this requirement on racial harassment plaintiffs.
It could also be that judges treat these cases differently because, for a range of reasons not yet fully understood, they find
racial harassment plaintiffs' claims of harassment less credible.
61 The Juliano & Schwab study included the universe of cases in the designated
time period. Id. at 555-56. The Chew & Kelley study used a stratified random sampling method. Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 53-54.
62 See Chew & Kelly, supra note 7, at 81-82, 94-95.
63 Id. at 62 n.54.
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Perhaps judges, who are mostly male, find sexual harassment
more plausible because they can imagine their wives and daughters as hypothetical plaintiffs. In contrast, given that judges are
mostly White, it might be more difficult for them to identify with
minority plaintiffs in racial harassment lawsuits and to share their
perception of discriminatory harassment. The reality is that individuals of different races perceive discrimination and harassment
differently, 64 and there is no reason to think that judges would be
any different.
B.

Distinctive Theories

There is very little research that specifically compares racial
harassment and sexual harassment, but the little that exists offers
striking contrasts between the two. Aravinda Nadimpalli
Reeves's study of gender and race dynamics in Chicago law firms
exemplifies.6 5 While her sociological research considers the
range of gender and race dynamics broadly, it prominently includes an analysis of racial harassment and sexual harassment.
Furthermore, in explaining the dynamics of racial harassment
and sexual harassment at the firms, she finds a different theoretical framework appropriate for understanding each form of harassment. Her reference to Rosabeth Moss Kanter's theory of
tokenism to explain racial harassment and Barbara Gutek's sexrole spillover theory to explain sexual harassment illustrates the
need for distinctive theories to understand the distinctive dynamics of the two forms of harassment.6 6 Her work also demonstrates that harassment, both racial and sexual, may be
understood best in the specific workplace context (i.e., law firms)
in which they occur.
1.

Dynamics of Racial Harassment
Reeves reports that both White and African American attor-

See infra text accompanying notes 104-15 (discussing relevant research).
Aravinda Nadimpalli Reeves, Gender Matters, Race Matters: A Qualitative
Analysis of Gender and Race Dynamics in Law Firms (June 2001) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author). This research is
based on sixty-five in-depth interviews of African American and White attorneys in
medium-size and large law firms. Id. at 60. There are comparable numbers of African American men, African American women, White men, and White women. Id.
Half of the interviewees were randomly selected through attorney directories; the
other half were referred by other attorneys, i.e., an adapted "snowball strategy." Id.
at 60-64.
66 See infra text accompanying notes 72-88, 91-103.
64
65
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neys feel the culture in law firms has changed so that blatant racism is less likely. However, both groups also acknowledge that
occasional incidents of blatant racism still occur and numerous
inferences of inferiority and other subtle racial harassment exist. 67 White attorneys tellingly assess the inappropriateness of racist incidents based on whether a racial minority hears the
remark or whether the comment occurs in the workplace, rather
than on the racialized content of the remark itself. 68 Thus, White
attorneys appear most focused on the firm's legal and financial
liability risks, as well as their own.69 The following are excerpts
from Reeves's study; the race and gender of the speaker is noted
at the beginning of each quote.
[White male:] [T]here was a group of lawyers sitting around in
one . . . lawyer's office and they were talking about welfare
reform and one of the lawyers said something about "those
lazy bums on welfare-why can't they get off their asses and
get jobs?" And another lawyer said something to the effect
that everyone on welfare was Black and maybe there was a
laziness in Black culture. When he said that, everyone looked
around like, whoa, glad no one who would be70 offended heard
that. People are very careful about liability.
[White female:] I was sitting in a client meeting... one of our
clients actually started to tell an off color joke [about racial
minorities] ... and the opposing client said, "this is an inappropriate place to tell that joke." And it made me feel better
because I would have felt very uncomfortable telling my client
that I think you're a pig. I think most lawyers know well
enough. I mean, their personal feelings aside, hopefully they
know well enough that in the law firm you don't say things
that are inappropriate.7 1
Reeves finds Rosabeth Moss Kanter's theory of tokenism particularly appropriate for understanding the causes of racial har72
assment and its effects on African American attorneys.
Kanter's theory focuses on work groups in which there is a numerically dominant group and a smaller token group.7 3 She
posits that the dominant group often treats the tokens as symbolic representatives of its category rather than as individuals,
67 Reeves, supra note 65, at 222-23, 225.
68 Id. at 217-18.
69 See id. at 218-20.
70
Id.at 218.
71 Id. (alteration and omission in original).
72 See id. at 216-47.
73 See ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND
42 (1977).

WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION
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and perceives them through the particular frames of visibility,
contrast,and assimilation.7" As applied to the law firm context in
Reeves's study, Kanter's theory would consider White attorneys
the dominants, given their high proportional representation at
the firms, and African Americans and other racial groups as the
tokens, given their minority representation.
Consistent with Kanter's theory, Reeves finds that because African Americans, as tokens, are so visible, they experience performance pressures that those in the dominant group are less
likely to experience.7 5 White attorneys, as dominants, also perceive African Americans in contrast to their own identities,
prompting White attorneys to be self-conscious of and exaggerate attributes of their culture to strengthen the boundaries
between them and the tokens. The following examples demonstrate Reeves's findings:
[White male:] I did serve on the hiring committee at the larger
firm. I noticed that a lot more questions and doubts were expressed about minority candidates. A lot of comments about
affirmative action and "needing to get our numbers up."
[Comments on] that we needed to increase the number of minorities at the firm. Would minorities have a difficult time fitting in? Do we have any clients that would have a problem
working with African American lawyers? Whose responsibility would it be to watch them? Yes, watch them... make sure
that they don't screw up. These were the kinds of comments
made. Both firms had a very difficult time holding onto minority attorneys they
did hire. So they were always looking
76
for the "right fit."
[White male:] One firm I was at had no minorities on the hiring committee. And, whenever we would hire another minority associate, I think we had around four or five, there were
partners that called them "A's" [pronounced A squared] for
affirmative action cases[.] . . . The Black candidates weren't
necessarily any less qualified than any other candidates we
hired ... we were under the gun from a large client to get our
minority stats up, and we weren't a popular firm for minority
candidates to apply to ... so, we hired the ones we got apps
[applications] from.., some were good candidates... but we
called them all "A 2s." I had one Black associate in my group,
and once
in a while a partner would ask me, "how's the A2
77
doing?",

74 See Reeves, supra note 65, at 216 (summarizing Kanter's theory).
75 See id. at 219.
76

Id. (alteration and omission in original).

77 Id. at 219-20 (alternations and omissions in original).
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White attorneys' possibly benign or even complimentary intent
in distinguishing African American attorneys did not prevent the
minority attorneys from feeling insulted:
[White female:] I had a very good friend [an African American male] ... when we were summer associates together, we
went to a founders' luncheon .... [Wlell, you go around the
table and you answer questions that the partner[s] have. And
[the African American male lawyer] answered a question, and
one of the partners said "that's so articulate." So, of course
we get back to the office, and he's just exploding in his office
• . . he's Stanford educated and went to Northwestern law
school... why would he not be articulate? He was also on the
debate team, he's gone to nationals .... Yeah, to get "so articulate" with nothing about substance . . . . "Oh look, he can
speak." So he did feel that always he was underestimated.78
[African American male:] Sometimes the White partners will
say things that they think are compliments. Like one partner
came to me one day and said "go find me some more lawyers
like you." And in the context of the conversation, "like you"
meant African American. Why couldn't he just say "go find
me some good lawyers" . . . the perception of you as the ex79
ception to the rule is what is hardest to deal with sometimes.
[African American male:] No blatant remarks at a law firm.
People are too careful. They use codes instead. Like they will
say that they like the minorities as people, but their work
product is not quite up to par. Or they will say that about the
Black judges ... that they're nice people but they're incompetent. I don't hear them make the same comments about White
judges or attorneys. Also, I have White attorneys say that the
Black judges have personal biases that affect their rulings, the
outcomes. That has always amazed me because that is never
said about White judges ... it's like the White judges' rulings
are never affected by their biases. . . . The same for minority
attorneys-if you're on the plaintiff side of a race-discrimination suit, it's "oh well, he's only pushing the suit because he's
Black." And if you're on the defense side, it's "oh, what an
obvious move by the firm or the defendant to put a Black man
out there for this suit." You never have the80opportunity to get
past the codes to be judged on the merits.
Kanter's theory also asserts that "the characteristics of tokens
as individuals are often distorted to fit preexisting generalizations
about their category as a group"-a process Kanter calls assimilation . Reeves's work illustrates that these stereotypes may dif78

Id. at 220 (alterations and omissions in original).

79 Id. at 221 (omission in original).
80 Id. (omissions in original).
81 KANTER, supra note 73, at 230; see

Reeves, supra note 65, at 233-39.
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fer depending on the occupation. In the context of lawyering,
African American attorneys believe there are preexisting generalizations about them as incompetent, having substandard writing skills, and having been hired because of preferential
affirmative action treatment.8 2
These stereotypes lead to a cycle of subtle disparate treatment.
While firms have positive expectations of entering White attorneys' performance, African American attorneys report that the
firms' stereotypes of their incompetence and substandard writing
skills are quite real and active.8 3 Moreover, they report that
these stereotypes combined with their token status lead to their
work being more closely scrutinized.8 4 Given these circumstances, African American attorneys felt they had to work considerably harder to achieve a comparable level of credibility as
White attorneys. 85 At the same time, the stereotypes of their incompetence resulted in lower quality assignments that ultimately
led to conclusions of their unsuitability for partnership.8 6
Reeves concluded that this cycle was a substantially different
one than the one a White attorney would undertake in his or her
progression toward a partnership in a law firm.87 In contrast,
many White attorneys did not feel that there were different expectations or standards for Whites and African Americans.8 8
Finally, Reeves's data suggests that African American attorneys are subject to racial harassment in their organizations more
frequently than they would like to admit. Respondents reported
that their experiences are "a rare incident on the racial radar
screen," but their interviews in the aggregate reveal a prevalence
of racialized comments.8 9 As other social scientists have found,
there appears to be a tendency for minorities to downplay racial
incidents in their workplace. 90
82
83

Id.
Id.

84

Id. at 234-35.

85

Id.

at 233-34.
at 234.

Id. at 236.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 233.
89 Id. at 222-23.
86

90

See, e.g., KATHERINE

C.

NAFF,

To

LOOK LIKE AMERICA: DISMANTLING BAR-

RIERS FOR WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN GOVERNMENT

note 65, at 222-23.

137-39 (2001); Reeves, supra
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Dynamics of Sexual Harassment

Both men and women attorneys report a change in organizational climate in the wake of Supreme Court cases drawing attention to the possibility of organizational liability. While more
blatant and direct sexual harassment, such as quid pro quo har-

assment, has decreased substantially, it has not disappeared. Women attorneys still report unwanted touching and incidents of
being propositioned. At the same time, more subtle and indirect

forms of harassment are quite prevalent.
While Reeves uses Kanter's token theory to explain racial harassment, she uses alternative theories to explain sexual harassment in the law firms. In particular, she finds Barbara Gutek's

sex-role spillover theory effective for studying subtle and indirect
forms of sexual harassment.91 Gutek's theory asserts that socially constructed, gender-based expectations of women spill

over into the workplace, prompting men to view women as sexual objects rather than as work colleagues. 92 The gender ratio

also makes a difference: women in male-dominated jobs are
more likely and women in gender-integrated jobs are less likely
to experience sex-role spillover.9 3
In particular, many male attorneys report sexualized conversa-

tions outside the presence of women attorneys; in effect, harassment has gone "underground." These attorneys' comments
evidence the spillover theory that women are viewed as sexual

objects:
[White male:] I've probably even said things that if my wife
heard them, she would feel it's inappropriate. Nothing disre91

Reeves, supra note 65, at 151-70; see BARBARA A.

GUTEK, SEX AND THE

(1985); Barbara A. Gutek & Aaron Groff Cohen, Sex Ratios, Sex Role
Spillover, and Sex at Work: A Comparison of Men's and Women's Experiences, 40
HUMAN RELATnONS 97 (1987); Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios,
Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. Soc. IssuEs,
Winter 1982, at 55. In addition to the sex-role spillover model, Theresa Beiner
describes three other major social science theories of sexual harassment: the sociocultural or power model (focusing on male dominance), the organizational model
(emphasizing the role of hierarchical power structures in organizations), and the natural/biological model (emphasizing biological and evolutionary instincts). BEINER,
supra note 15, at 114-32.
92 GUTEK, supra note 91, at 15-18. Men may also view a woman coworker as a
mother, daughter, sister, or wife, but Reeves's work did not report the spillover of
these roles. Gutek also notes that men are subject to sex-role spillover, but men's
stereotypes as leaders or financial providers do not invite others to harass them. See
id.
93 See BEINER, supra note 15, at 118-19; GUTIK, supra note 91, at 129-51.
WORKPLACE
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spectful, but I have commented on a woman's physical appearance, and I have joined in conversations with other men
commenting on women's appearance ... about female attorneys and female staff. But we would never make comments to
them directly. That was actually one of the things that we
would discuss, how you can't compliment women anymore because of the fear of complimenting a woman who will be
offended. 94
[White male:] Men discuss the female associates. The conversations are always couched in "we shouldn't be talking about
this, but" or "this is really inappropriate, but." Women's sexuality, their attractiveness, their bodies, whether or not we
would want to have sex with them, how they would be in bed,
etc. I'd really like to think it's just harmless innocuous macho
talk, but some men make these kinds of comments so frequently. And the more someone talks about this, the more
you do wonder if he can see women as colleagues, as equals.
You start wondering if some men can actually talk to women
instead of just talking about them because they will tell you
about conversations that they have had with women where
they were thinking about her breasts the whole time.9 5

Also consistent with Gutek's theory are attorneys' reports of
firm-sanctioned social events in which the sexuality of women is
the basis of the entertainment. 96 Reeves notes the bind that women attorneys experience. 97 On one hand, they can go to these
events and be uncomfortable, angry, or humiliated. 98 On the
other hand, they can refuse to go to these events and be excluded
from networking and sponsorship opportunities that these events
provide and be criticized as "not one of the gang": 99
[White female:] In some ways, it's almost too many to name,
but I'll tell you two egregious incidents. The first one was
when a male partner turned 50 ... the firm wanted to throw
him a birthday party, and per his request, he wanted the party
to be at a strip bar. Everyone was invited ... the men and the
women. When some of the male associates talked about the
party, they referred to the bar as a "titty bar" and it was fine
because it was a firm sanctioned event. It was absolutely absurd. Most of the women did not go. I definitely did not go.
So how do we evaluate it? Is it that women aren't team players? That incident made me very angry, but who are you going to complain to... the response is going to be that that was
94 Reeves, supra note 65, at 154 (omission in original).
95 Id. at 155.

Id. at 160 (alteration and omission in original).
97 Id.
96

98

Id.

99 See id. at 160-61.
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where he wanted it. Another partner's birthday party . . .
some of the male associates sent a belly dancer to the bar for
the party ...

their reasoning was that they checked with his

wife first, and she was fine with it, so no one else should have a
problem with it. The women associates were clearly very uncomfortable. Again, if you complained, you just would not be
invited again

. .

. I mean, it was really weird being around a

group of guys watching this woman dance and they were
cheering her on. The price you pay [for complaining] is too
high. 1°°
Reeves also describes pornographic e-mails as a source of blatant sexual harassment. 10 1 Although firms often have policies on
the appropriate uses of e-mails, these policies have not stopped
10 2
these incidents:
[White female:] [T]here was a period of time when the emails
would come around at least once or twice a day. I would erase
them immediately, but there would be a second or two where I
would have to see it because those emails looked like any
other office email until you opened it, and some of them were
very graphic, sexually I mean. I got so sick of it that I went to
one of the associates who was sending them and told him to
take me off
the list. He told me to loosen up and not take it so
10 3
seriously.
Thus, while Reeves uses Kanter's token theory to help explain
racial harassment, she finds Gutek's spillover theory more appropriate for understanding sexual harassment. As the above interview excerpts illustrate, Reeves finds ample support for Gutek's
theory that men's casting of women as sexual objects spills over
into the workplace, leading to sexual harassment.
III
IMPLICATIONS

Sexual harassment jurisprudence serves as the model for all
kinds of harassment, including racial harassment. The cornerstones of harassment law as delineated by the Supreme Court are
built around sexual harassment fact patterns. Courts and commentators routinely assume that these same legal principles and
their interpretations are appropriately applied to racial harassment claims.
100 Id. at 161 (alteration and omissions in original).
101 Id.
102
103

Id.
Id.
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Analogizing racial harassment to sexual harassment in the absence of further study, however, is problematic. One intuitively
suspects that racial harassment and sexual harassment have fundamental differences regarding, for instance, their causes, targets,
and consequences. Rather than relying only on intuition, this
Article presents empirical evidence of some of those differences.
In particular, this Article substantiates that individuals who
bring racial harassment lawsuits are distinct in ethnicity and gender, and describe their harassment differently than those who
bring sexual harassment litigation. Moreover, it finds that judges
reach very different conclusions in racial harassment lawsuits
than sexual harassment lawsuits. While sexual harassment plaintiffs only win approximately half their cases, racial harassment
plaintiffs fare even worse. In addition, drawing on sociological
research on gender and race dynamics in law firms, different theories are effective in explaining the variations of harassment, suggesting that the causes and manifestations of each type of
harassment are distinct.
While research comparing racial harassment with sexual harassment is still in its early stages, tentative observations indicate
significant dissimilarities between the two. While much attention
has appropriately been focused on sexual harassment, it is now
time to develop a jurisprudential model specifically for racial
harassment that is cognizant of its distinct attributes and complexity. As this model evolves, there are many issues to address.
To what extent should the elements of a racial harassment claim
be reinterpreted? To what extent are the elements of a sexual
harassment claim ever appropriate to a racial harassment claim?
As the legal community begins to puzzle through these major jurisprudential issues, two relevant issues discussed in the concluding remarks of this Article should be considered. Neither issue is
easily resolved, but it is critical that the legal community addresses both.
A.

Varied Racial Perspectives on What Constitutes Harassment

Given that the purpose of Title VII is to remove hostile,
debilitating work environments, it is essential to understand
when targeted racial groups consider their workplace hostile and
debilitating. This task, however, is complicated because Whites
and minority Americans have different perceptions of what constitutes racial discrimination and harassment. At the same time,
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Whites' perspectives are important because Whites are typically
supervisors and coworkers of minority employees and are also
the most likely defendants in racial harassment cases.

°4

Citing others' research of employees at large companies, Katherine Naff notes that "black and white managers may hold cognitively different theories to explain what happens in the
organizational world in which they live."10 5 She continues, "That
Euro-Americans and people of color often live in very different
perceptual worlds has been continually demonstrated by polling
data."'0 6 Based on her own research, Naff reaches the same conclusion about employees of the federal government. 0 7 She
asked thousands of federal employees for their opinions on how
minorities and nonminorities are treated in their organizations.' 8 Table 4 shows that the most dramatic differences are
consistently between African Americans and Whites. In comparison to Whites, African Americans generally describe a work environment with more discrimination of minorities. For example,
61.4% of African Americans, but only 23.4% of Whites, strongly
agree or agree that "[m]inority women face extra obstacles to
advancement."

A supervisor's perception of a situation affects not only his or her assessment
of racial harassment, but also the appropriate institutional response. See NAFF,
supra note 90, at 135-37.
105 Id. at 135 (quoting Clayton P. Alderfer et al., Diagnosing Race Relations in
16 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 135, 148 (1980)).
Management,
10 6
104

Id.

107 See id. at 146-53.
108 Naff's research is based on 6251 employees of color responding to a workforce

diversity survey. Id. at 150. While she uses the term "Euro-Americans," I use the
term "Whites" or "White Americans" in this Article.
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TABLE 4
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF How MINORITIES
ARE TREATED IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS (PERCENT
AGREEING OR STRONGLY AGREEING WITH STATEMENTS)' 0 9
Asian
African
Pacific
Native
White
American American Latino/a American American
In my organization,
nonminorities receive
preferentialtreatment
compared to minorities.

58.0

34.6

40.0

26.0

8.2

Minority women face
extra obstacles to
advancement.

61.4

34.4

48.7

37.2

23.4

The viewpoint of a
minority is often not
heard at a meeting
until it is repeated by a
nonminority.

50.9

25.7

38.2

25.3

8.3

Once a minority
assumes a top management
position, that
mposition
, te
position often loses
much of its power and
prestige.

44.1

18.2

24.7

25.9

7.5

My organization is
reluctant to promote
minorities to supervisory or management
positions.

46.2

26.5

27.5

20.8

7.7

Naff's research confirms another complicating but important
factor in understanding when targeted racial groups consider
their workplace environment hostile and debilitating. Each racial and ethnic group has its own unique perceptions. Assuming
a single minority perspective risks gross overgeneralizations. To
illustrate from Table 4, a different percentage of each racial
group agrees with the statement: "In my organization, nonminorities receive preferential treatment compared to minorities."
For example, 40% of Hispanic Americans, but only 26% of Native Americans, agree or strongly agree with that statement.
109 Table 4 is a partial reproduction of Naff's Table 6.3. Id. at 147 tbl.6.3. In
contrast to this Article's Table 4, Naff's table also shows the percentage of each
racial group that "[n]either agree nor disagree" or "[s]trongly disagree/disagree."
Id.
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Each racial and ethnic group is harassed in particular ways in
part because society imposes myriad stereotypes.1 1 ° Each racial
group also has had different experiences of discrimination in
American history.'1 1 Considering these stereotypes and histories, each racial group is likely to find distinct comments and conduct insulting, intimidating, and demeaning.
Hispanic
Americans, for instance, are more vulnerable to harassment on
the basis of their suspected immigration status and English language abilities; African Americans about their work habits and
general intelligence; Asian Americans about their cultural traditions and social skills; and Native Americans about their reliability and sobriety.1 12
Racial stereotyping and discriminatory treatment also affect
individuals of each group differently. 3 Furthermore, all individuals of a given racial group do not necessarily perceive their
workplace in the same way. Just as there is no single minority
perspective, there is not a single perspective of members of any
racial group. Lawrence Bobo and Susan Suh, for instance, consider how a host of factors (including nativity-United States or
foreign-gender, age, education, occupation, and income) affect
individuals of each racial group's reporting of personal experience of racial discrimination in the workplace. 1 14 They find, for
instance, that African Americans born overseas are much less
likely to report racial discrimination than African Americans
born in the United States; that less-educated Asian Americans
are much less likely to report discrimination than the most highly
educated Asian Americans; and that younger Latinos/as are less
110 See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992) (describing negative stereotypes of each racial

group).
111 These writings, for example, describe the history of Asian Americans including
their experiences of discrimination: FRANK H. Wu, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA
BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent"
Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1994); and Faye K.
Cocchiara & James Campbell Quick, The Negative Effects of Positive Stereotypes:
Ethnicity-Related Stressors and Implications on OrganizationalHealth, 25 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 781 (2004) (suggesting that positive stereotypes, such as Asian
Americans being stereotyped as the "model minority," may create adverse effects).
112 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 110, at 1260-81.
113 See NAFF, supra note 90, at 148-49 tbl.6.4.
114 Lawrence D. Bobo & Susan A. Suh, Surveying Racial Discrimination: Analyses from a Multiethnic Labor Market, in PRISMATIC METROPOLIS: INEQUALITY IN
Los ANGELES 523, 529 tbl.14.3 (Lawrence D. Bobo, Melvin L. Oliver, James H.
Johnson, Jr. & Abel Valenzuela, Jr. eds., 2000).
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likely to report discrimination than older Latinos/as.' 1 5
Finally, despite the common societal belief that racial harassment is essentially a White-on-Black phenomenon, the reality is
more multicultural. Bobo and Suh's research illustrates that harassers and their targets are of all racial backgrounds and combinations. In fact, African Americans are most likely to report
personal experiences of discrimination when their coworkers are
Asian Americans, and Asian Americans are most likely to report
16
discrimination when their coworkers are African Americans.
Kelley's and my research on racial harassment cases also confirms that, while judicial opinions most typically report alleged
White harassers and Black targets, there are other pairings. Harassers and targets may be of the same race or of different minor17
ity groups; alternatively, minorities might harass White targets.'
B.

Relationship Between Racial Harassmentand
Sexual Harassment

While emerging empirical evidence shows that racial harassment and sexual harassment are not the same thing, that does not
mean that no relationship between the two forms of harassment
exists. By explicitly acknowledging that they are distinct, however, one can begin to explore more seriously how they are related. Understanding their relationship will help one to better
understand each form of harassment. It will also prompt one to
explore the relationship between sexual harassment, racial harassment, and other forms of harassment such as religious, age,
disability, or national origin harassment. 1 8
Racial harassment and sexual harassment, for instance, may
share some commonalities despite their distinct characteristics.
Their illegalities are based in part on the same legislative foundation.1 1 9 Some harassers may target "outsiders" without particu115

Id.

116 Id. at 531 tbl.14.4.

Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 71-72.
For example, I teach a seminar at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
entitled "Harassment in the Workplace," in which each student selects a form of
harassment to study in detail. After their research, the class collaborates as a group
on commonalities and dissimilarities in the causes, manifestations, and legal remedies of the varied forms of harassment.
119 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is directed at both racial and sexual
harassment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). In contrast, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
from which §§ 1981 and 1983 derived, only addressed racial harassment. See Civil
117
118
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lar regard to whether that outsider status is based on race or
gender.
Some harassing incidents may be exclusively sexual harassment or exclusively racial harassment. Other incidents may be a
combination. Some researchers, for instance, study the sexual
harassment of minority women, suggesting that there are elements of both forms of harassment. 12° They point to harassers'
use of such degrading phrases as "Black bitch" to demonstrate
this possible intersection. 1 21 The concerns raised in this Article
about presumptively using sexual harassment as the model encourage the rethinking of whether the analysis of such cases
should be reframed. Rather than assuming that the harassers
and victims perceive their harassment as primarily sexual-and
wondering how it might differ for minority women, perhaps the
legal community should instead consider whether the harassers
and victims perceive their harassment as primarily racial-and
wonder how it might differ because of the gender of the target.
This shift to first considering a race-based model, rather than a
gender-based model, is not merely procedural. It may well be
that considering racial harassmentas gendered rather than sexual
harassmentas raced will provide more accurate insight into harassers' motivations and into why targets feel humiliated and degraded. Harassment of minority targets might be more complex
and nuanced than originally thought.
In Reeves's research of lawyers, for instance, African Ameri122
can women report less sexual harassment than White women.
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 41 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983 (2000)).
120 See BEINER, supra note 15, at 23, 211; Reeves, supra note 65, at 40-46. See
also sources cited supra note 17.
121 E.g., BEINER, supra note 15, at 23, 211.
122 See Reeves, supra note 65, at 168-70. At the same time, Black male attorneys
describe their bind as individuals with "male privilege" yet lacking the protection of
"White privilege."
[African American male-describing an informal conversation between
male attorneys:] They get very graphic, but most of the time, they are talking about White women, and can you imagine the reaction if I were to join
in on that conversation. As a Black man, I have to be very careful about
how I negotiate those conversations. On one hand, I am "privileged" because I am being included in the conversation, and inclusion is the name of
the game in law firms. But on the other hand, if they were to hear a Black
man talk about these White women in the same way, as sexual objects, the
perception of that conversation is dramatically different.
Id. at 167-68.
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They conjecture that White men racialize them more than sexualize them:
[African American female:] I think there's a difference between how White women and Black women are treated ....
[T]he majority of men at a firm are White men, and they have
no idea how to deal with you, but they definitely don't deal
with you as a sexual person .... They can't bond with me over
sports like they can with Black men ... so I'm in this weird
category where they awkwardly negotiate their interactions
instead of dealing with me like a whole human
with me
1 23
being.

In other research, however, African American and other minority women feel particularly targeted for harassment, including
24
sexual harassment, and attribute their targeting to their color.1
These research examples suggest that harassers' motivations and
targets' harms are interwoven with race (and gender) in ways
that are not currently understood.
As employees, employers, judges, and juries consider the viability of a racial harassment complaint, this Article argues that
they should not feel bound to the sexual harassment model.
They should instead affirmatively question the appropriateness
of analogizing one form of harassment to another. In order to
fulfill the goals of Title VII, they should carefully consider the
nuances of racial harassment, rather than rotely assuming that
harassing behavior in the workplace is monolithic.

123 Id. at 170.
124 See sources

cited supra note 17; see also Tara E. Kent, Sexual Harassment in a
Multicultural Workplace 22-28 (May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University) (on file with author) (summarizing research on sexual harassment of women
of color).
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